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This paper describes a new data set of the forecasts of output growth, inflation, and unemployment
prepared by individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee.  The paper discusses the
scope of the data set, possibilities for extending it, and some potential uses.  It offers a preliminary










  Since 1979, the Federal Reserve has regularly published forecasts of inflation, output growth, and 
unemployment.    The forecasts reflect the views of the members of the Board of Governors and the 
presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.  The published forecasts, however, include only simple 
summary statistics. 
  The Federal Reserve generally releases documents  and background material related to monetary 
policymaking, such as transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings and staff 
forecasts, with a five-year lag.  In August 2007, in the course of another project (Romer and Romer, 2008), 
we pointed out to the Federal Reserve that the economic forecasts of FOMC members were part of the 
policymaking process, and that the logic of the disclosure policy therefore suggested that the forecasts 
underlying the summary statistics should be released with the same five-year lag.  In May 2009, the Federal 
Reserve released some of these forecasts—though, as described below, not the full set of forecasts more 
than five years old. 
  This note describes  the coverage of the data, possibilities for extending them, and some of their 
possible uses.  It  also briefly examines  the relationships among the members’ forecasts of different 
variables.  The current form of the full data set is available as an on-line appendix to the paper. 
 
I.  COVERAGE 
  The FOMC forecasts followed a relatively fixed format during the period currently covered by the new 
data set.  The forecasts were prepared in conjunction with the Federal Reserve’s semi-annual Monetary 
Policy Reports to Congress, which were submitted in February and July.  Four variables were forecast:  
nominal GDP growth, real GDP growth, CPI inflation, and the unemployment rate.  The forecasts of the 
first three variables were for the four quarters ending in the fourth quarter of the year; the forecasts of the 





forecasts were for both the current year and the following year. 
  The members of the FOMC (including the regional bank presidents who were not voting members of 
the FOMC) initially prepared their forecasts prior to the FOMC meeting preceding the release of the 
Monetary Policy Report.  In preparing their forecasts, the members had access to considerable information, 
including the staff forecast prepared for the FOMC meeting.  The members were not given any specific 
assumptions about the conduct of monetary  policy, but instead conditioned  their forecasts on their 
judgments of “appropriate” policy.  After the meeting, the members had an opportunity to revise their 
forecasts.  The materials released by the Federal Reserve do not include any forecasts from the chair; 
whether the chair prepared any forecasts during the period currently covered by the data set is unclear. 
  The individual forecasts released by the Federal Reserve are the final forecasts that it has for each 
Monetary Policy Report for the period 1992-1998.  The ending date reflects a decision by the FOMC to 
release the data with a ten-year lag rather than the standard five-year lag.  The starting date reflects gaps in 
the Federal Reserve’s documentation.  There are two problems with the materials prior to 1992.  First, for 
some meetings, the forecasts of some or all of the members are simply missing.  Second, in some cases the 
Federal Reserve has members’ initial forecasts but not their final forecasts, or it is not clear whether the 
forecasts are the initial or final ones.  For some meetings, for example, the materials the Federal Reserve 
now has do not indicate when the forecasts were prepared, and summary statistics computed from the 
materials do not match the statistics published in the Monetary Policy Reports. 
  The on-line appendix includes several small items in addition to those supplied by the Federal Reserve, 
including the names of the regional bank presidents, whether they were voting or non-voting members of 
the FOMC at the time of each forecast, and real-time figures for the realized values of the variables that 
were forecast. 
 
II.  PROSPECTS FOR EXTENDING THE DATA SET 
  In principle, the data could be extended in three directions:  backward in time, in greater depth for the 





Reserve has some data for the period 1979-1991, although they are incomplete.  With regard to the second, 
the forecasts released by the Federal Reserve are the final forecasts for which it has documentation, 
completed after the associated FOMC meeting and after members have seen one another’s  forecasts.  
Whether the Federal Reserve has information about the initial forecasts is unclear.  There may also be 
background memos containing additional information about such issues as the exact timing of the forecasts.  
Finally, with regard to the third direction, the Federal Reserve obviously has the forecasts from 1999 to the 
present. 
  The only direction in which extensions will occur largely automatically is forward in time:  each year, 
the Federal Reserve will be willing to release an additional year of forecasts.  Given its trend toward greater 
transparency, however, the Federal Reserve might decide at some point to release additional data, 
particularly if researchers express interest in them.  For example, the Federal Reserve already releases 
verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings, which often include explicit discussions of members’ views about 
the outlook for the economy, with a five-year lag.  It might therefore decide at some point that the same lag 
is appropriate for the members’ forecasts.  Similarly, it might decide that there was a potential benefit and 
little cost to releasing the data prior to 1992, despite their incomplete coverage.
1
  In studying the data, one issue that could be important is that the forecasts may not always reflect the 
FOMC members’ best judgments about the likely outcomes, for two reasons.  First, because they believed 
 
 
III.  SOME POTENTIAL USES 
  There are a variety of issues one could examine using data on the forecasts of individual monetary 
policymakers.  In many cases, the seven years of data that are currently available will not be enough to 
provide substantial insight.  For this reason, this section simply lists some possibilities, recognizing that in 
most cases serious analysis will have to await the availability of additional data. 
                                                       
1 If the Federal Reserve released these data, it would be likely to identify any uncertainties and imperfections in them.  
If not, researchers could perform the task, noting cases where it was unclear whether the forecasts were the members’ 
initial or final forecasts and where summary statistics computed from the forecasts that were released differed from 





that only summary statistics would be released, some members may have put little effort into their 
forecasts.  Second, in some cases the members’ objective may not always have been to report their best 
estimates.  For example, a member who favored lower interest rates than other members of the committee 
might have erred on the side of reporting forecasts of output and inflation lower than his or her actual point 
estimates. 
  The issues one could investigate using the new data include: 
•  Are the disagreements among members mainly about aggregate demand or aggregate supply?  
That is, when one member forecasts higher output growth than another, does he or she typically 
forecast higher inflation than the other, lower inflation, or is there no systematic relationship? 
•  Are there systematic differences in forecast accuracy across different types of members of the 
FOMC?  Possible comparisons include regional bank presidents versus members of the Board 
of Governors, members with Ph.D.s in economics versus ones without Ph.D.s, and more 
experienced versus less experienced members. 
•  Do the forecasts pass standard tests of forecast rationality?  For example, are members’ 
forecasts biased or excessively volatile? 
•  What are the characteristics of forecast revisions (either revisions from before to after the 
FOMC meetings, if those data become available, or from one Monetary Policy Report to the 
next)?  For example, do members appropriately account for the informational content of other 
members’ forecasts and of the staff forecast? 
•  Do forecasts have predictive power for dissenting votes? 
•  Are the forecasts of the regional bank presidents for the economy as a whole correlated with 
conditions in their Federal Reserve districts? 
•  What do the forecasts reveal about specific episodes?  For example, one could ask to what 
extent the members were surprised by the low unemployment and low inflation of the 1990s.  If 





disinflation would succeed in reducing inflation, and what they believed about the output and 
unemployment costs of doing so. 
 
IV.  EXAMPLE:  CROSS-SECTIONAL CORRELATIONS 
  As noted above, seven years of semi-annual data is of limited value in addressing time-series issues.  
For example, it is almost certainly too short a sample to provide useful information about forecast accuracy 
or forecast revisions. 
  The data have a substantial cross-section component, however:  for each Monetary Policy Report, there 
are  between sixteen and eighteen individual forecasts.  This section therefore looks  briefly at the 
relationships among the forecasts of different variables.  That is, it examines whether, if one sees a member 
forecasting a higher value of some variable than other members, this provides any information about his or 
her forecasts of other variables. 
  The analysis focuses on the relationships between three pairs of variables:  output growth and CPI 
inflation, output growth and the unemployment rate, and CPI and GDP inflation.  For the July Monetary 
Policy Reports, where the members make forecasts for the current year and the next year, the analysis uses 
the forecasts of cumulative output growth and inflation over the two years and  of  the level of the 
unemployment rate at the end of the second year.  The forecasts of GDP inflation are computed from the 
forecasts of nominal and real GDP growth.  Throughout, only the cross-section variation in the forecasts is 
considered.  Specifically,  the forecasts of each variable are regressed on dummy variables for each 
Monetary Policy Report, and the analysis is performed on the resulting residuals. 
  Table 1 shows the standard deviations and correlations of the residuals, and Figure 1 presents the 
scatter plots corresponding to the three focal correlations.  One message is that there is substantial variation 
in the forecasts.  The standard deviation of the growth forecasts is 0.37 percentage points; that of the 
unemployment rate is 0.16 percentage points; and that of CPI and GDP inflation are 0.39 and 0.45 
percentage points, respectively.  Figure 1 shows that these numbers are not driven by a handful of outliers, 





dropping the three most extreme observations (the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in July 1993 and 
July 1994, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in July 1994) lowers the standard deviation from 0.39 
to 0.34 percentage points. 
  A second message is that there is no clear relationship between forecasts of real variables and inflation.  
None of the correlations between either real GDP growth or unemployment and either of the inflation 
measures is close to statistically significant.  Panel a of Figure 1 displays this lack of correlation visually.  
(The analysis focuses on CPI inflation because it was the measure of inflation that was explicitly reported 
in the forecasts during this period.)  To the extent that there is any relationship, it is slightly positive.  A 
member’s growth forecast at a meeting being higher by 1 percentage point than those of other members is 
on average associated with his or her inflation forecast being higher by 0.08 percentage points (standard 
error = 0.07).  Dropping the observation at the lower right of the figure (the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland forecast in July 1995) raises the coefficient to 0.15 and makes it marginally significant (s.e. = 
0.07).  On the other hand, also dropping the observation at the upper right (the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis in July 1992) lowers the coefficient back to 0.10 (s.e. = 0.07). 
  The final message is that the forecasts of concepts that are closely related are strongly correlated in the 
expected directions, but that there is nonetheless substantial independent variation.  The correlation 
between the forecasts of GDP growth and the unemployment rate is –0.40.  That between the two inflation 
measures is 0.65.  Both are overwhelmingly significant.  A member’s forecast of GDP growth being higher 
by one percentage point is associated with his or her forecast of the unemployment rate being lower by 0.18 
percentage points (s.e. = 0.03).  The CPI inflation forecast being higher by 1 percentage point is associated 
with the GDP inflation forecast being higher by 0.75 percentage points (s.e. = 0.06). 
  Panels b and c show, however, that knowing a member’s forecast of one of the variables still leaves 
considerable uncertainty about his or her forecast of the related variable.  Adding the GDP growth forecast 
to the regression of the unemployment forecast on the dummy variables for each Report  reduces the 
standard deviation of the residuals only from 0.159 to 0.146 percentage points.  Similarly, adding the CPI 





0.450  to 0.341 percentage points.  Again, these results are not driven by outliers.  Discarding the 
observation at the upper right of panel b (Governor John Laware’s forecast in February 1995) moves the 
correlation of the forecasts of GDP growth and  unemployment from  –0.40 to  –0.45; discarding the 
observation at the lower right (the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in July 1995) moves it from –0.40 to 
–0.37.  In panel c, excluding the observation at the upper right (the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in 
July 1994) only lowers the correlation from 0.65 to 0.63. 
  As this example suggests, the Federal Reserve’s decision to release the forecasts of the individual 
FOMC members  provides researchers with a potentially valuable  new data set on monetary policy.  
Particularly as the time period covered by the data is extended, the data set will allow a variety of new 
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  Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
 
                                                                       Growth      Unemp.      π (CPI)      π (GDP) 
  Real GDP Growth  0.37 
  Unemployment Rate  –0.40  0.16 
  CPI Inflation  0.08  –0.05  0.39 
  GDP Inflation  0.02  –0.04  0.65  0.45 
 
Entries on the diagonal are standard deviations of residuals of regressions of the 
forecast of the variable on dummy variables for each Monetary Policy Report, in 
percentage points.  Off-diagonal entries are correlations between residuals. 
 Figure 1 

















































































c.  Inflation Measures